

CRISIS DOCS

June 14, 62

Dob-McG

end: The Amb expressed his admiration for the political leadership of the Pars, and asked me who I thought would win the Congressional elections in November. I told him that this was a question he should put to others, and we parted as cheerfully as we began.

July 3, McCloy-Dob

Ref to conversation of summer '61: K had accused the W of secretly preparing for tests while we were negotiating. I had then told K that if he could do, he could send experts over to our proving grounds to examine into just what we were doing, providing we could do the same with our experts on their side. Mr. K said this was not "practicable." It is now apparent why it was not "practicable," and I did not feel that on this matter K had been frank with me. . . .

He said he had to admit that testing last summer did cast doubts on our intentions regarding the test ban negotiations. . .

July 12, 62 Sec - Dob

Dob said that story (K saying 6 or 7 bombs enough for UK) had begun with a conversation with Christall (Dob present) who had said (to?) he did not want war because 6 or 7 bombs would be enough to destroy UK.

Aug 20 Schlesinger - Dob

On Aug 14 Following are the high points of an entirely non-memorable conversation.

1. The Amb's chief interest was evidently in American domestic politics. He asked me a number of questions about the prospects of the autumn elections, the strength of the conservative in Congress, the power of the John Birch society, etc.
2. ... He said he had no info on the rumor that K might be coming to NY in Sept. and gave the impression of slight skepticism about it.

Aug 23 Deb-See. discussion on non-diffusion of molecules.

Oct 18 : 5pm

Pres, Sleeter, Thompson, Villabrand,
Akabovsky; Grogko, Semenov, Dob, Sukhodrev

Mr G then said that the Sov Gov had already indicated that it would do nothing with regard to West Berlin before the US elections, unless it was compelled to do otherwise by the activities of the other side.

However, the Sov Gov proceeded from the fact that it was necessary to hold an active dialogue in November to bring about concrete results with regard to a German peace treaty and to the normalization of the West Berlin situation on the basis of such a Treaty.

June 3, 12:45 1961

Pres: concerned to find out ways & means of not permitting situations when the two countries would be committed to actions involving their security or endangering peace, to secure which is our basic objective.

--- L's & K's obligation to the peoples of the US and the USSR respectively was to have this struggle

MC

Nov 29, 62

Pres, Rush, Thompson; Mikoyan, Dobrynin

Pres: There is no reason why statements that the US does not intend to invade Cuba should not go on record. Yet this is hardly necessary since it is obvious that the US could have invaded Cuba any number of times beginning with April 1960 (?) but did not do so. This should suffice to make US intentions clear. As a matter of fact, ^{only recently} the Pres was speaking against those Americans who suggested an invasion of Cuba. This, once again the attitude of the US was clear. However, beginning in July the Soviets have sent over 100 ships loaded with arms and military material to Cuba. While this was going on the Pres, trusting official statements by the Soviet Union, continued to affirm that there was no danger to the US from an arms buildup in Cuba. This had led to very serious political difficulties on all levels.

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Michigan: What the Pres had said presents an extremely serious matter. yet the SU does not desecrate or approach.

No one can believe that the arms build-up in Cuba
[No denial that statements were misleading]
was offensive and intended against the US. It had,
in fact, been decided as early as June, by Chairman
K and his colleagues, of whom Mr. M. was one, that the
US would be told about the arms build-up, in every
detail, by the SU at an appropriate moment. First it
was intended to communicate with the US on a confidential
basis and then to make an announcement to the press.

Of course, this was something which the SU was not
obligated to do since after all, the US does not inform the
SU of its military moves. As for the purpose of the

the military build-up, it was obviously not offensive, no military man and not even a civilian could ever believe that rockets in Cuba could be necessary or even useful for an attack against the US.

The decision had been made to inform the US after the elections so as to avoid influencing in any way the political campaign in the US. The Pres himself certainly would not want to have the elections influenced by few moves.
[statements] Of course on the 22nd of Oct no intimation of the buildup was made by the SU but even if a disclosure had not taken place the SU would have brought the entire buildup to the attention of the US on Nov 8th or 10th, immediately after the elections.

Feb 2 Pres: problem not due to fact that the SU did not make a statement to the US about the arms buildup — as it obviously has the right to proceed ~~without~~ with any such measures without announcing them to the US — but on the contrary that the SU had made a statement over

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according to which no offensive weapons were
being sent to Cuba or were going to be sent there.

Mr. M said obviously the two speakers had
a different interpretation of the ~~same~~^{recent} events. The
fact remains that the purpose of the arms buildup in
Cuba was defensive and not offensive. They were
sent there to defend the island against invasion
and for no other purpose. It is silly to believe that
those (40) missiles upland in Cuba could be needed
for an attack on the

[Mikoyan to Bolshakov?]

Mr. M. would like to ask once more whether the Pres
thinks that the SU wishes to attack the US.

The Pres said he did not know what may have
been the reasons of the Sov Gov to establish the base.
The fact is, ^{that} it was established.

Cuba was not threatened by the US. At the end of
September and throughout October, the Pres attacked
those people in the US who spoke in favor of an aggressive
policy towards Cuba. There were no indications whatever at
the time when, in fact, Mr. M. said a decision [to tell]
had been taken by the SU, that any aggressive moves by the
US were contemplated. Had the question been addressed
to the Pres by the Chairman at that time, the Pres would
have been glad to say as he says now that no invasion
of Cuba is intended.

An invasion of Cuba is not a solution to the Cuban
problem. We do not live now in the early days of the 20th
Century. The US has obligations extending throughout the world.

It is true that there are refugees from Cuba who say annoy Castro but there is no ~~intent~~ policy on the part of the USG to invade Cuba. Unquestionably, ~~surely~~ as able a man as the late Ambr is the US must have been aware of that.

As for Soviet intentions, ~~the~~ major war was not an aim of the SU but it seems that a policy of threat may well have been the objective. Mr. M. said that a statement about the build-up would have been made in November. At that time the missiles would have already been fully replaced. What would have been the position of the USG which had publicly affirmed its trust in the statements of the Soviet leaders?

The entire episode cannot be interpreted in any other way than as a major attack against the present Administration and the Gov of the US.

The question is now how the lack of understanding between the two goes can be transformed into mutual understanding. Already in the recent past in the question of Laos and then again in that of Cuba, the two countries have come very close to the edge of the abyss. The question is now what about the future? How many more such near escapes or such situations of dire danger will happen during the next decade because the two governments do not understand one another?

[This is not the only source of conflict; but they do suspect each other, dangerously.]

... Mick: the Sov move into Cuba had for a purpose only defense and deterrence. ... (Nixon in favor of invasion, also Portuguese grounds) ... Under such circumstances, ~~there~~ was good reason to prepare deterrents and defense. It is quite clear

that such was the purpose of the SU, which was
going to inform the US that what it intended through
the buildup on Cuba was the defense of that island
and not an aggression against the US. after all, the
SU had more than enough long-range missiles placed
on its own territory to send anything else. 42 missiles
are insignificant for offense and therefore it is clear
that they were meant for defense. Moreover, these
missiles remained in the hands of the Sov military and
could not have been used without signal authorization
from Moscow. Mr. N. would like to mention in confidence
that there exists Sov legislation which makes it illegal
to place more or TN weapons under non-Sov control.

... Pres: Of course, it is clear that the USG has very little liking for the present gov of Cuba. This, however, does not mean an intent to invade them. After all, the SO does not like the present gov of Albania. This does not mean that the SO will invade Albania, as in such a case the as well as in that of a hypothetical invasion of Cuba, international consequences would be very grave. [?]

The Pres stated he is not, however, so terribly interested in Mr. Castro. What he is interested in, once again, is the attitude of the Sov Gov. How is it possible to go through the coming decade if we are, as in the past, to move from crisis to crisis.